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Hatamoto Rule: A Study of the Tokugawa Polity as a Seigneurial System
 
 
J. F. Morris 
 
In the period of confusion following the surrender of Edo Castle to the Restoration army 
in 1868, amid rumours concerning the fate of the holdout elements of the Tokugawa 
forces, another unrelated story was making its way across the Kantō Plain surrounding 
Edo. A certain hatamoto1 had returned to his fief in an attempt to extract emergency 
funds from his peasants. Enraged, the peasants had killed him, and then eaten his flesh.2 
The killing of one’s lord itself was shocking enough, but that the peasants had supposedly 
then devoured him lent this rumour a horror appropriate to the upheavals of the time. 
Whether this story was true or not, for peasants on the Kantō Plain, the simmering and 
accumulated hatred toward the hatamoto it assumed was understandable, and therefore 
believable. However, what peasants across the Kantō Plain knew in 1868 has been more 
than ignored in mainstream modern research: it has been systematically argued to have 
been either insignificant, or impossible. 
 The nature of the Tokugawa polity and the problem of state formation in 
Tokugawa Japan are emerging as a new subject of debate in English-language studies 
(Berry 1986, White 1988), but the parameters of the debate as it is forming ignore some 
of the basic structures of power and social control in Tokugawa Japan. From an earlier 
ambivalence about the nature of rule in Tokugawa society, a clear consensus has emerged 
that in this period, rule was concentrated in the hands of the Bakufu and some 270 
daimyō. Rule and social control are seen as having been essentially bureaucratic, with 
the role of lesser samurai as seigneurs being merely titular at best. 
 This paper argues that an examination of hatamoto fief-holding forces one to 
 
 The author wishes to thank Dr R.H.P. Mason of the Australian National University, 
and Dr Melanie Hall-Yiengpruksawan of Columbia University for their critical 
comments, and the staff of the Starr East Asian Library at Columbia University for 
their cooperation in getting access to material. 
1 The word hatamoto has been variously translated as ‘bannerman’ or ‘liege vassal.’ We 
can define a hatamoto as (a) being a direct vassal of the Tokugawa Shōgun, (b) with 
a fief assessed at less than 10,000 koku of rice, (c) with the right of personal 
audience with the Shōgun, and (d) receiving his fief directly and individually, rather 
than as a member of a company. For a discussion of hatamoto in English, see 
Conrad D. Totman (1967: 131-132). 
2 The ‘factual version of this incident is given in Yamada (1968:43). The lurid version 
comes from the Goyō-dome (uncatalogued) of a village headman in modern Chiba 
Prefecture, in the collection of the Tōhoku University Library Collection. 
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the conclusion that this view of Tokugawa Japan is unnecessarily one-sided, and that 
the Tokugawa state was essentially a seigneurial system.3 After a brief survey of the 
historiography of research on hatamoto fiefs to show how certain basic assumptions 
about feudal society and Tokugawa society in particular have skewed mainstream 
research, this paper examines the actual historical content of these fiefs, demonstrating 
that these occupied a significant position within the Tokugawa system of landholding. 
Moreover, since existing conceptions of hatamoto rule are intimately intertwined with 
conceptions of the nature of the state and class rule in Tokugawa Japan, arguing that 
hatamoto fief rule formed a meaningful part of the overall apparatus of social control 
requires one to address the problem of the nature of the Tokugawa state. This paper 
concludes with a consideration of the term ‘seigneurial system,’ as a key idea for 
understanding the structure of the Tokugawa state, and with a series of speculations 
about how our immediate ‘factual’ conclusions concerning hatamoto fiefs may affect our 
overall interpretation of the Tokugawa polity. 
 
Summary of Contemporary Research on Hatamoto Fiefs 
No original English-language research exists on hatamoto fiefs and only two studies, 
Totman (1967: 131-141) and Yamamura (1974:40-41), use secondary sources to deal with 
the subject in passing. When Totman wrote, research on hatamoto was, as he admits, 
still very limited and his conclusions were of necessity tentative (p.131). In particular, 
his sources (principally Mori {1960}, Suzuki {1971}, Kitajima {1964}), include no proper 
case studies of small to middle-sized fiefs (i.e. those of less than 2,700 koku), which are 
the fiefs that really form the centre of debate on the content of hatamoto landholding 
(see Table 1). Yamamura’s monograph on hatamoto incomes concludes on scarce evidence 
‘that it was unlikely that any bannermen (hatamoto) significantly increased their income 
by exploiting’ the opportunities offered by fiefholding (p.41), as by the ‘beginning of the 
eighteenth century, the bannerman had exchanged a large part of his authority as the 
master of his fief for his peasants’ favors in the forms of advance payments and loans 
from wealthier peasants’ (p.40). Yamamura’s conclusion largely conforms to standard 
interpretations of hatamoto fiefs at the time he wrote, but struggling through the tangle 
of his footnotes to the parts purportedly providing the basis for his assertions reveals 
that most of his sources are either irrelevant to the discussion, do not provide the 
 
3 A full explanation of the term ‘seigneurial system’ as used in this paper is left to the 
Conclusion, since this term itself is part of this paper’s conclusion. For immediate 
purposes, a seigneur may be defined as a landholder who rents to cultivators who 
are at least nominally unfree. A seigneurial system is a system where such 
landholding provides the basis for the ruling class. 
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purported supporting evidence, or worse, actually contradict what Yamamura claims.4 
In particular, Yamaguchi (1962) is quoted as a case study providing the evidence for 
above quote claiming that the hatamoto did not enjoy rises in tax rates on their fiefs after 
the eighteenth century, which Yamaguchi does state. However, Yamamura totally ignores 
the main thrust of Yamaguchi’s argument, which is that, far from relinquishing their 
seigneurial powers in the eighteenth century, the hatamoto used non-voluntary loans 
and advances instead of heavier direct taxation as a more suitable way of consistently 
increasing the income derived from their fiefs. About the most polite thing that can be 
said about Yamamura’s limited statements on hatamoto fiefs is that they are a 
misreading of his sources; as serious academic work, they do not warrant consideration. 
 Returning to Totman, the single most influential source used by him to describe 
hatatmoto fiefs in general appears to be Kitajima (1964:368-395), whose extensive study 
of the Tokugawa Bakufu remains a standard reference work today. Totman follows 
Kitajima in all the latter’s major points of argument. Kitajima divides hatamoto into two 
groups, claiming that the 250 or so hatamoto with fiefs of over 3,000 koku were allowed 
rights of governance equivalent to those of a daimyō and, like daimyō, rotated their place 
of residence between their fief and Edo. He claims that hatamoto with fiefs of less than 
 
4 For example, one of the central pillars of Yamamura’s argument, the assertion that 
tax rates on hatamoto fiefs were controlled by the Bakufu (p.40), is supported by 
three digressive footnotes, in which only Shinmi(1967:89-98) and Sasaki (1964: 232-
235; 353-357) are actually tangentially relevant. Shinmi as referenced provides a 
long discussion of the mechanics of allotting fiefs, not within the Tokugawa Bakufu 
but within Owari domain, with only a passing remark that the Bakufu probably 
followed the same system of allotment. This is a far cry from proving that the 
Bakufu controlled rates of tax on hatamoto fiefs! Sasaki (pp.232-235) quotes a 
famous Bakufu edict of 1602 concerning the settlement of disputes between 
hatamoto and fief peasants over rates of taxation, in which the Bakufu expressly 
disavows responsibility in matters of rates of collection on hatamoto fiefs and 
established grievance procedures for disputes only in exceptional cases: again, 
hardly clear evidence of the Bakufu establishing guidelines for intervening in 
hatamoto fiefs on a regular basis, as Yamamura would have one infer. The second 
reference to Sasaki (pp.353-357) is irrelevant to Yamamura’s main text. Shinmi is 
directly misquoted elsewhere on the matter of land reclamation on hatamoto fiefs 
(Yamamura: p.39 footnote 22). Shinmi suggests as an educated guess that land 
reclamation conducted on hatamoto fiefs accumulated to the hatamoto free of the 
duty to provide extra military service (p.91); in modern terms, Shinmi is suggesting 
that hatamoto received any extra income from land reclamation tax free. 
Yamamura, however, misreads Shinmi as saying that hatamoto rarely gained any 
extra income from land reclamation, which is not only a gross distortion of Shinmi, 
but also ignores the explanation Shinmi provides for why Yamamura’s database 
drawn from official Bakufu records does not reveal any significant land reclamation 
by hatamoto. 
Hatamoto Rule 
J.F.Morris 
 
4 
 
3,000 koku were required to collect tax/rent5 on their fiefs at rates established by the 
Bakufu and lacked independence in judicial matters. Furthermore, as a result of Bakufu 
policy in breaking up the unit character of these smaller fiefs through fief re-allotments, 
most men holding fiefs of under 3,000 koku left administration to the local Bakufu 
intendant (daikan). Put simply, this view states that hatamoto of over 3,000 koku could 
not have maintained strong control over their fiefs, while those of less than 3,000 koku 
lost effective control as a direct result of Bakufu policy. 
 Kitajima’s argument that the dividing up and scattering of individual hatamoto 
fiefs must have resulted in the fief-holders’ losing effective control of their fiefs has been 
refined by later Japanese scholars who emphasise the central role that control of the 
village community (sonraku kyōdōtai) had as the foundation of social control in the 
Tokugawa period. According to this argument, since the majority of hatamoto fiefs did 
not occupy a whole village, the fief-holder could not control the social unit that was the 
key to effective rule. Therefore, it is assumed as self-evident that smaller hatamoto, 
whose fiefs were typically divided up and scattered so that no part covered the whole of 
any one village, could not have exercised effective control over their fiefs. 
 In the above arguments of Totman, Kitajima and others for the lack of 
significant seigneurial powers by hatamoto with fiefs of less than 3,000 koku, the crux 
of the argument hinges not on the actual confirmed content of hatamoto fief rule so much 
as it does on the definition of ‘significant’ or ‘effective’ fief rule. Significant rule is 
commonly defined as that exercised by a ‘independent feudal lord’ possessing full and 
autonomous powers of administration, taxation and jurisprudence. This definition of an 
‘independent feudal lord’ is not derived from an analysis of the realities of ‘feudal rule’ in 
any real historical context: it is simply a reiteration of the composition of the extra-
economic compulsion exercised by a hypothetical ‘feudal lord’ extracting surplus 
production from unfree serfs in the classic Marxist definition of feudalism as a system of 
land-holding. 6  In other words, it is nothing more than part of a larger theoretical 
construct. While ‘historical facts’ can only acquire ‘meaning’ through the filter of the 
historian’s interpretation, historical theory divorced from any historical reality is merely 
vaporous. It is therefore not surprising that when measured by this definition the greater 
majority of seigneurs in Tokugawa Japan appear to have not possessed significant rights 
 
5 Both in their historical derivation and function at the time, the dues paid by 
peasants to rulers in Tokugawa Japan combine the aspects of both public tax and 
private ground rent. The awkward compromise of ‘tax/rent’ has been adopted to 
express the Japanese word nengu (lit. ‘annual tribute’). 
6 Kyōto Daigaku Bungakubu Seiyōshi Kenkyūshitu Hen(1958), Entry for keizaigai 
kyōsei Ausserökomischer Zwang (p.212). 
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of fief rule. If measured by this standard, most seigneurs in Medieval Europe, for 
example, would not have counted either (Morris 1988:14-20). The fundamental problem 
with this definition of ‘significant rule’ is that it fails to acknowledge the necessary 
relationship between individual seigneurial rule and state power. On the one hand, it 
fails to appreciate that not only can the state intervene to support the purposes of the 
seigneurs as well as to suppress them. More importantly, it fails to acknowledge that in 
a seigneurially-organised society the state and seigneurial power do not merely coexist: 
each needs the other.  
 The influence of the above preconceptions concerning the village as the basis of 
rule and the definition of significant seigneurial rights has resulted in the long-held 
assumption that hatamoto fiefs were insignificant, not because a proper examination of 
hatamoto fiefs per se has demonstrated this, but because certain basic ideas governing 
research into the Tokugawa period have defined things to have been so. This is a classic 
case of scholars’ perceptions shaping their view of ‘the facts’ more than ‘the facts’ 
informing their perception. Nevertheless, research in local history in recent years has 
unearthed a wealth of documentation which has cumulatively begun to force a 
rethinking of the realities of hatamoto fiefs.7 
 
The Size and Distribution of Hatamoto Fiefs 
Since hatamoto fiefs are a form of landholding, we need to know something about their 
physical characteristics in order to establish that they actually represent a significant 
form of Tokugawa period landholding. 
 The distribution by size of hatamoto fiefs granted in land in the early eighteenth 
century is summarized in Table 1. The greater majority of hatamoto fiefs were in the 
range of 500 to 3,000 koku. Conversely, of those hatamoto who received their fiefs as 
stipends paid from the Bakufu granaries (slightly over 50% of the total number of 
hatamoto), only some 2% or so received fiefs of over 500 koku. As a rule of thumb, 
therefore, we may consider that the effective dividing line between fiefs granted in land 
and those granted as stipends to have lain at the 500 koku line (Suzuki 1971:205). 
Including those hatamoto with fiefs of under 500 koku, in the early eighteenth century 
the number of hatamoto holding landed fiefs was 2,354 men. The total size of their 
holdings amounted to 2.7 million koku, surpassing in size the aggregate assessed 
holdings of the three largest daimyō of Tokugawa Japan (the Maeda of Kanazawa, the 
 
7 The strength of existing preconceptions in distorting interpretations of evidence is 
related by Shirakawabe (1988:122 footnote 25), who shows how existing models of 
Edo period society have formerly led scholars, including himself, to adopt 
conclusions in opposition to the very evidence that they themselves have uncovered. 
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Shimazu of Kagoshima, and the Date of Sendai [KKS 2:382]). 
 Hatamoto fiefs were distributed throughout the length and breadth of Japan in 
a total of 3,778 blocks. However, their highest concentration was in the provinces of the 
Kantō Plain around Edo, the shogunal capital. This area contained 3,009 blocks 
accounting for 79.6% of hatamoto fiefs. Another 401 blocks or 10.6% were concentrated 
in the former Tokugawa homelands of Mikawa and Suruga Provinces (Suzuki 1971:223, 
Table 2). Comparison with other forms of seigneurial landholding on the Kantō Plain 
yields some perspective on the aggregate size of hatamoto landholding around the 
shogunal capital. Within the provinces surrounding Edo, hatamoto fiefs outnumbered in 
total kokudaka (aggregate value assessed in koku of rice) both daimyō and Bakufu lands 
(tenryō) in the provinces of Musashi and Kōzuke; in the province of Awa it represented 
the largest form of private seigneurial landholding (Suzuki 1971:221-227). In the other 
Kantō provinces, hatamoto fiefs were at the very least a major, if not the dominant form 
of seigneurial landholding (KKS 2:382). 
 This overview of the distribution of hatamoto fiefs brings out two problems 
relevant to our understanding of them. 
 Firstly, Edo and its environs were the heartland of Tokugawa power. Tokugawa 
prestige, and hence legitimacy,8 depended to a large extent on the maintenance of law 
and order within this politically sensitive region in order to demonstrate the moral 
superiority of Tokugawa rule. Yet the distribution hatamoto fiefs meant that, in lieu of 
any Bakufu institutions to replace them,9 one of the necessary preconditions for the 
maintenance of peace on the Kantō Plain was the proper functioning of hatamoto 
seigneurial holdings.  
 Secondly, the persistence of several hundred hatamoto holdings in the Kinai 
region poses a major problem for one traditional explanation for the effective demise of 
small-scale seigneurial holdings in Tokugawa Japan. Small-scale seigneurial holdings 
 
8 The word ‘prestige’ here is used with the special meaning given by Watanbe Hiroshi 
to the role that this word played as a key term in maintaining Tokugawa authority 
(1986). Watanabe points out the importance of maintaining and image of 
undamaged, and hence undamageable, prestige played in maintaining Tokugawa 
control. Serious social disturbances in the area surrounding Edo would strike at the 
very heart of this ‘system of prestige.’ 
9 Individual hatamoto might ask Bakufu intendants (daikan) responsible for Bakufu 
lands near their fief to perform certain tasks such as assessing standing crops for 
tax/rent. However, these were individual actions performed as personal favours 
between friends and in no way constitute a Bakufu policy of replacing hatamoto fiefs 
with control by intendants. For example, the Murakoshi (1,200 koku) had the 
Bakufu intendant assess a 33 koku fragment of their fief in Sagami Province from 
between 1646 to 1648. By 1654, however, the Murakoshi were assessing taxes by 
themselves (KKS 8 Jō: 55-59 {137-141}). 
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(i.e. those of daimyō retainers and hatamoto) are generally supposed to have either 
atrophied or have been totally eliminated by the socio-economic changes of the early 
seventeenth century, and to have survived only in more ‘backward’ areas of Japan. 
Whatever ‘backward’ may mean, all scholars agree that the Kinai was the most 
‘advanced’ region in contemporary Japan. Moreover, the persistence there of hatamoto 
fiefs has long been recognized by scholars. It is widely held that these hatamoto fiefs 
were large, often over 3,000 koku, and this size accounted for their persistence. In other 
words, hatamoto fiefs in the Kinai region have been considered a special case, according 
the division of hatamoto seigneurial rights suggested by Kitajima and followed by 
Totman. However, in reality, the majority of hatamoto fiefs in the Kinai region were not 
necessarily larger than 3,000 koku (Sasa 1986:22-28). Furthermore, actual case studies 
of smaller hatamoto fiefs reveals that, while the purported significance of the 3,000 koku 
dividing line in determining hatamoto status may be important in determining military 
function and ceremonial status, it has only a very limited relation to rights of fief rule 
(see below). Unless more convincing evidence is advanced for making hatamoto fiefs in 
the Kinai region a special case, the linkage commonly purported to exist between socio-
economic ‘backwardness’ and the survival of small-scale seigneurial holdings must be 
brought into question.10 
 Despite the significance in itself of the size and distribution of hatamoto fiefs, 
focusing too much on these aspects runs the risk of reducing the problem solely to a 
matter of the regional history of Kantō village society. This obscures the larger 
theoretical issue, that is, the pivotal role of the hatamoto in defining the relative position 
of the different types of seigneur within the Tokugawa polity and the overall nature of 
the system itself. It is this larger framework that gives the issue of hatamoto seigneurial 
holding its larger significance, and which is the main issue to which we must turn. Before 
doing so, it must be noted for clarity’s sake that at this stage, this paper focuses solely 
on the matter of hatamoto fiefs, and deals with the matter of daimyō retainer fiefs only 
is so far as they provide a contrast to the former. Therefore, this paper does not purport 
in any way to provide an adequate discussion of the latter, for which interested readers 
should consult Morris (1988). 
 
The Structure of Hatamoto Fiefs 
 
10 Hatamoto were not the only small-scale seigneurs in supposedly ‘advanced’ regions 
of Japan. For an outline of small-scale seigneurial holding throughout Tokugawa 
Japan, see Morris (1988:23-24). 
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If the social changes underlying the formation of the Bakuhan system did not lead to the 
effective demise of small-scale seigneurial holding, we need to define in what ways we 
can consider hatamoto fiefs to have been historically significant. This task is twofold: the 
flaws in the argument for the effective demise of hatamoto landholding must be 
demonstrated, and those features of hatamoto landholding which lend it historical 
significance must be delineated. In practice these two tasks are interrelated, and an 
examination of the factual bases of the fundamental arguments for the effective demise 
of hatamoto landholding will also serve to demonstrate the salient features of actual 
hatamoto fief rule. Prior research on hatamoto fiefs as represented by Kitajima and 
Totman raises three issues to be considered: the relationship between the hatamoto fief 
and village society; hatamoto rights of taxation; and hatamoto powers of jurisprudence.  
 
1. Hatamoto Fiefs, the Village Community, and the Peasant 
One major obstacle to seeing hatamoto fiefs as a viable form of seigneurial holding lies 
in standard interpretations of the nature of the fundamental relationship between 
samurai rule and the village community. One essential characteristic of Tokugawa period 
samurai rule is that it was based on control through the agency of the peasants’ own 
social unit, the village community. This contrasts with the pre-Tokugawa situation, 
where samurai or their retainers lived in the village and could exercise individual and 
direct control over each peasant family. Collection of tax/rent, maintenance of the land 
and family registers, allotment of corvée service, maintenance of local law and order, and 
in fact almost any aspect of aspect of Tokugawa control of the countryside required the 
support of the village community in order to function. It was the irreplaceable – and the 
sole – institutional link between the urbanized samurai seigneurs and the peasant 
producers on whom they depended for their livelihood. Therefore, the fragmentation of 
hatamoto fiefs meant that in many cases the hatamoto did not control all of any one 
village, and therefore apparently lacked control of the sine no qua of Tokugawa 
seigneurial control. However, an examination of the internal structure of hatamoto fiefs 
reveals that, in spite of seeming fragmentation and lack of control of the village 
community, the fief nonetheless still served as an adequate vehicle for implementing 
viable control over fief peasants. 
 Since the vast majority of hatamoto fiefs were apportioned by the Bakufu, 
Bakufu policy on the matter of fief allotment provides the first key to understanding the 
social foundations of hatamoto rule and how this affected the relationship between 
hatamoto and the village. In line with the views advanced by Kitajima, it has long been 
common practice to see the fragmentation of hatamoto fiefs as a result of a conscious 
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Bakufu policy to limit control of hatamoto over their fiefs. However, closer examination 
of Bakufu policy in fief allotment reveals this view to be both superficial and biased in 
its reading of the evidence.  
 First, at the village level, the fragmentation of hatamoto fiefs has too often been 
assumed without a sufficiently critical examination of the evidence. In reality, the 
Bakufu took great pains to allot fiefs in such a way as to preserve both the geographic 
unity of the fief within a village and the one-to-one relationship between hatamoto and 
fief peasants. Of the two, the relationship between hatamoto and fief peasant was given 
precedence over geographical unity, so that while a fief might end up appearing 
geographically scattered within a village, the basic rule of ‘one peasant, one seigneur’ 
was maintained. Even when this basic rule could not be observed in full, a minimal 
number of holdings were divided with the clearly greater part of each divided holding 
falling within one single fief. Under this system of division, dividing peasant holdings 
between different seigneurs did not lead to a blurring of the distinction between which 
peasant belonged to which fief, as is assumed by Kitajima and others who ignore the 
matter of relative size in the division of peasant holdings. Thus, if following Kitajima, 
one merely counts the number of peasants with holdings divided between multiple 
seigneurs, one reaches the conclusion that peasant holdings were very divided, whereas, 
in terms of the actual amount of land divided, the division was marginal (Shirakawabe 
1986:84-109). Furthermore, not only did the Bakufu and the hatamoto strive to maintain 
the principle of ‘one peasant, one seigneur,’ but also evidence suggests that the villagers 
themselves wished to avoid the prospect of double seigneurial jurisdiction (Nishiwaki 
1986:183-186). Therefore, when considering hatamoto rule, we can assume that each 
block of the hatamoto fief had as its basic unit of control a set of discrete peasant 
holdings.11 Bakufu intentions in distributing fiefs in several blocks distributed over a 
wide area seems to have been more concerned with assuring the hatamoto an equitable 
balance in income, rather than in destroying the basis for their rule (Shirakawabe 
1986:108-109). 
 
11 The pattern of a one-to-one relationship between seigneur and fief peasants began to 
break down with the growth of tenancy and changes in the pattern of peasant 
holdings, a trend that became pronounced from the close of the eighteenth century. 
This phenomenon was not restricted to hatamoto fiefs, but affected all seigneurial 
holdings, including Bakufu lands. Unlike the Bakufu, however, the smaller 
seigneurs took steps to retard the scattering of peasant holdings by attempting to 
limit movement of peasant titles outside of the fief (see Table 2, below), or even by 
providing funds to reclaim titles that had been bought by off-fief peasants 
(Nishiwaki 1986:189). 
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 However, even if one assumes that the Bakufu itself had no intention of 
weakening hatamoto fiefs by fragmenting them, the larger problem of the relation of 
hatamoto rule to the village community remains to be answered. Few scholars today 
would question the fundamental role of communities (kyōdōtai), in providing the basis 
for social control under the Bakuhan system. The problem in dealing with cases of 
multiple seigneurial holdings within a single village community and seigneurial is that 
a one-to-one equivalence between village community seigneurial land-holding has too 
often been assumed to be the necessary precondition for control of the village. However, 
the very nature of both the Tokugawa system of landholding and the Tokugawa village 
community make this assumption difficult to support. 
 It may be possible to assume a relationship of one seigneur per village within 
most daimyō domains, where, if one totally ignores the role of the Bakufu, usually only 
one seigneurial jurisdiction existed throughout the whole domain. However, daimyō 
domains represent only one of several forms of seigneurial landholding in Tokugawa 
Japan. Under the Bakuhan system, or indeed in any seigneurially organized polity, 
individual seigneurial holdings existed within and were supported by the larger 
organization of the state. While each seigneur was individually responsible for realizing 
the benefits of his or her title, seigneurial landholding as such was a right guaranteed 
by, and a subset of, the functions of the whole state. Tokugawa seigneurial control of the 
village was not exercised on an individual basis: it was a complex web of different layers 
of titles supported by the overall structure of the system and independent of any one of 
its parts. Considering the nature of seigneurial rule under the Bakuhan system, there is 
no reason inherent in the structure of the seigneurial system to expect a one-to-one 
relationship between each individual seigneur and village community. 
 It is also a mistake to reify the Tokugawa village community as a single unified 
entity. The textbook model of the Tokugawa village is an ideal model based on trends 
which proceeded at different rates in different parts of the country. Not all villages in 
Japan developed at the same rate nor necessarily in the same direction. Moreover, the 
model assumes a village where rice production in wetfields was the dominant crop, 
despite the variety in the physical and social typology of the actual Tokugawa 
countryside. Nonetheless, despite the discrepancies between the ideal model and the 
reality of the Tokugawa village, seigneurial control throughout Japan was uniform in 
taking some form of dependency on the village as its basic unit of rule. The reason for 
this hinges on another fundamental aspect of Tokugawa rule: that is, the ‘village’ 
reflected in contemporary documents, was an entity defined by the samurai. 
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 The creation of a new form of village for administrative purposes by the samurai 
was carried out principally through the cadastral surveys of the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century. Of course, the samurai could not create a functioning village 
community by fiat: in order to function, their administrative village had to have some 
firm foundation in social reality and the long-term trends occurring in village society. 
However, had it arisen purely as a result of social change, the Tokugawa administrative 
village should have taken many different forms. It was samurai intervention that gave 
the village its uniformity. The administrative village was not created after rural society 
had reached stability: rather it was imposed from above on a society still in flux, as the 
closest approximation possible to an evolving natural social entity. Nonetheless, by 
imposing itself, the samurai administrative village became one of the factors 
determining the further development of rural society. Therefore, there is an important 
element in the genesis of the Tokugawa village that is external to the other social 
processes leading to its formation, and this of itself creates a gap between the 
administrative village and what we may call the ‘naturally-occurring village community.’ 
 Furthermore, it is incorrect to assume that this ‘naturally-occurring village’ was 
a single entity. In reality, it was a collection of many different smaller communities or 
mutual-assistance groups. The individual households banding together to form any given 
sub-community would vary according to whether rice was being planted, a house being 
built, or a funeral being held (Nakamura 1956). Few of these sub-communities coincided 
totally with the superset of the larger village community, and not all of them necessarily 
were contained solely within it. Therefore, the seigneurially-defined administrative 
village could only ever be a compromise, because, not only were all villages not the same, 
but there was an inbuilt structural diversity within each village community which meant 
that even the ideal natural social community underlying the seigneurs’ invention was 
itself only the average of the sum of many smaller interwoven sub-communities. 
 The reality of the function of the village under split seigneurial jurisdiction is 
that the village operated at various levels, both retaining its larger identity given by the 
cadastral surveys, and yet acting in subsets to serve the purposes of the different 
seigneurs with holdings within its boundaries. Here, the larger village served to give 
coherency to the individual parts, for example by maintaining law and order, but the 
existence of the larger village community did not necessarily prevent the individual 
seigneurial jurisdictions from following their own course in matters related to each fief. 
In this case, the existence of smaller sub-communities centred on a particularly powerful 
family within the village provided the social basis for individual seigneurial rule. 
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 Nomoto Village in Musashi Province provides one example of the complexity of 
the relations which could evolve between the village and seigneurial authority. Nomoto 
was divided into nine fiefs in 1705. In 1722, the nine different fief headmen held a 
meeting agreeing to tighten control within the village so that all burdens and dues would 
be properly met (HMS 172-173{162}). The significance of this agreement was that it 
aimed to reinforce the various standards of dues on the different fiefs recently created 
within the village. In contrast to the action by the village elite represented by the fief 
headmen, the smaller peasants made an appeal in 1729 to have the Bakufu enforce 
uniform standards for seigneurial dues throughout the various fiefs (Shirakawabe 
1986:115). In judging this case the Bakufu rejected the smaller peasants’ appeal, on the 
grounds that is was not Bakufu policy to enforce uniformity in exactions by individual 
hatamoto. The appeal by the smaller peasants represents a textbook case of the village 
community trying to assert its solidarity in the face of seigneurial divisions. On the other 
hand, the Bakufu decision in this case bespeaks its consistent position on this matter 
since the first edict it issued on this matter in 1602. Yamamura, following Sasaki, 
mistakenly claims that this edict demonstrates a Bakufu policy of interference in 
hatamoto rates of tax/rent.12 In reality, so far as the Bakufu was concerned, the level 
and form of hatamoto seigneurial dues on individual fiefs should be determined by each 
hatamoto according to his needs. 
 The struggle within Nomoto Village between the village elite and the smaller 
peasants did not end here. Despite the fact the village was reunited under one seigneur 
from 1763, the village elite succeeded in maintaining the former internal division of the 
village until the early Meiji period (HMS 270 {260}, 92 {87}). The contradictory 
movements by elite and ordinary peasants seen within Nomoto in 1722 and1729 suggest 
the reason for the survival of the administrative sub-division of the village beyond its 
functional life.  
The office of fief headman provided the village elite with a valuable way to 
enhance their power and wealth within the village. These elite also served as the nodes 
around which the various sub-communities within the village were organized, thereby 
giving the seigneurs an important lever to control sub-communities within the village. 
The centripetal movement by the smaller peasants of Nomoto in 1729 represented not 
simply an attempt to assert the autonomy of the overall village over divisive seigneurial 
jurisdiction: it was also an attempt to limit the collusion between village elite and 
seigneurs where the former used their ties with the latter to strengthen their position 
within the village at their neighbours’ expense. It was this collusion between hatamoto 
 
12 See note 4 above. 
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and village elite seeking advancement that provided the basis within the village for the 
hatamoto to implement their rule even when their fief (or a part of it) did not occupy the 
whole of one village. 
The factual basis for the argument that the Bakufu purposely divided fiefs in 
order to limit the fief-holders’ power is demolished by Shirakawa as summarized above. 
The more sophisticated ‘social change’ argument based on the evolution of the village 
community is inadequate, both in its theoretical understanding of the process of the 
formation of the Tokugawa period village, and also in its factual underpinnings. The 
significance of the example of Nomoto Village is that it provides a concrete illustration 
of the social mechanism whereby village society could be subdivided by the intrusion of 
multiple seigneurial jurisdictions. This shows that social development within the 
Tokugawa village was not one simple march towards overwhelming social cohesion to 
the exclusion of individual seigneurial control.  
 
2. Hatamoto and Tax/Rent 
The primary objective of hatamoto rule was the collection of as much agricultural surplus 
as possible, and the content of hatamoto rule ultimately comes down to the question of 
what was the extent of the rights of hatamoto to impose their own standards of tax/rent 
collection. Traditionally, hatamoto rights in this crucial sphere are assumed to have been 
minimal, and under heavy Bakufu restraint.13 However, apart from vague references in 
Bakufu law,14 the evidence for this assertion is tenuous.15 The single largest basis for 
this argument is the fact that the Bakufu adopted a policy of apportioning out new fiefs 
so that the fief holder was guaranteed an income equivalent to a tax/rent rate of 35% per 
100 koku (Suzuki 1971:214-219). The problem with this view is that assumes that the 
rate of collection of fief dues written by the Bakufu into the documents of enfeoffment 
automatically restricted the power of any hatamoto to collect such dues as he saw fit, 
 
13 Totman, for example, writes that ‘Tax rates and collection procedures were set by the 
Bakufu’ (1967:137). 
14 For example, Article 14 of the Laws for the Warrior Houses (Shoshi Hatto) issued to 
the hatamoto in 1635 prescribes that ‘Other than the prescribed dues in rice and 
other services on your fief, you shall not set up illegal exactions and cause your fief 
to fall into ruin’ (TKRK Zenshū 3:71-73{171}). 
15 Kitajima, for example, assumes that the purpose of an investigation of hatamoto fief 
tax rates conducted in 1632 must have been to determine whether taxation on these 
fiefs was within legal limits (1964:369). However, the content and method of the 
investigation clearly indicate that it was conducted to determine the financial 
situation of the fief holders, a related but qualitatively different problem from 
collection levels of tax/rent. The related problem of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s policy 
regarding fiefs is dealt with in Miki (1984). 
Hatamoto Rule 
J.F.Morris 
 
14 
 
rather than just ensure that he was granted land guaranteeing a certain minimum 
income at the time of enfeoffment. An examination of the powers hatamoto actually 
exercised in setting standards of collection shows that they retained important basic 
powers relating to fief fiscal matters, and that the Bakufu allowed them considerable 
discretion in setting the standards for tax/rent collection.  
 The fundamental basis for the right to independently impose standards of 
tax/rent collection in Tokugawa Japan was the legal power to conduct cadastral surveys. 
Therefore, any consideration of Tokugawa landholding must begin with a consideration 
of the right of any given category of seigneur to conduct cadastral surveys. The special 
significance of conducting these surveys was that it presumed the power to define which 
land was considered assessable for tax/rent collection, and the way in which it would be 
classified for those purposes. In short, conducting a cadastral survey touched upon the 
very basis for the organization of the contemporary seigneurial system, and as such was 
a function fundamental to the power of the state. In traditional approaches to the 
Bakuhan system, the state has been taken to be comprised of the Tokugawa Bakufu and 
the daimyō, to the exclusion of hatamoto and daimyō retainers. It is in this context that 
the growing body of evidence that hatamoto could legally conduct their own cadastral 
surveys gains significance. 
 Kanzaki Akitoshi has assembled evidence of sixty-four cases of hatamoto having 
conducted their own land surveys, with no Bakufu intervention, within the area of 
modern Kanagawa prefecture alone (KKS 2:437-442).16 Of these sixty-fours cases, a 
mere three cases were hatamoto holding fiefs the equivalent of 3,000 koku, the purported 
dividing line for meaningful hatamoto seigneurial rights. In fact, forty of these cases are 
from fiefs totaling 600 koku or less, with the smallest hatamoto holding a fief totalling 
only 160 koku. These hatamoto surveys were mostly conducted around the same time 
that the Bakufu was conducting its general cadastral surveys in the Kantō Plain, with 
most recorded cases falling between 1630 and 1680. This suggests that the hatamoto 
surveys followed the same general pattern as Bakufu surveys. However, Kanzaki’s 
analysis of the few surviving cadastral registers from hatamoto surveys suggests that 
these represented something more than fief holders merely acting as proxies for a larger 
Bakufu survey. 
 A few examples will serve to illustrate this point. The Ō’oka (2,700 koku) 
conducted a survey of their fief in 1678. The surviving registers from this survey show 
 
16 Kanzaki’s figure does not include cases of later resurveys done on the same fief, such 
as the Andō fief (see below). Furthermore, at least one more example can be added 
to Kanzaki’s list for Kanagawa Prefecture. See KKS 8 Ge 39-40{719} for a survey 
ordered by the Kurahashi (2,000 koku) in 1715. 
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that the Ō’oka produced an increase of 8% (380 koku into 410 koku) in one block of their 
fief and 63% (160 koku into 255.000 koku) in another. One of the reasons this was 
possible was that the Ō’oka used a different standard from that of the Bakufu for 
assessing the productivity of different grades of agricultural land. The Takuma (385 
koku) used similar methods to produce a 36% increase in the kokudaka of one block of 
21 koku from their fief in 1679. However, the most spectacular example is that of the 
Andō (2,540 koku), who conducted a total of seven land surveys between 1649 to 1730, 
thereby increasing the land registered in the main block of their fief from 381.400 koku 
to 924.587 koku. What is remarkable about the Andō surveys is not just the increase in 
the registered tax base, but the frequency with which the surveys were conducted. Seven 
times probably represents a record for the number of surveys conducted by a seigneur in 
the Tokugawa period. Not only did smaller hatamoto conduct cadastral surveys; the few 
surviving examples suggest that some at least were successful in implementing stricter 
and more frequent surveys than the Bakufu and other larger seigneurs. 
 Even if hatamoto could conduct their own surveys, it is still necessary to 
establish that these surveys had the same official status as daimyō surveys, for example. 
One way of determining this is to see how hatamoto surveys were treated by the Bakufu. 
It is in this connection that the Andō fief provides another important example in 
understanding the nature of hatamoto surveys. In a separate part of their fief, a 
miniscule block of some mere 18 koku, the Andō had a Bakufu intendant (daikan) 
conduct a survey on their behalf, in 1670. This survey was conducted as part of a larger 
survey that the intendant was conducting of the rest of the village within which the Andō 
holding was located. However, the intendant used a system for categorizing grades of 
cultivated land that was unique to the Andō in his survey of their part of the village, 
despite the insignificant size of this parcel of land. This case provides at least one 
example of a Bakufu official recognising the legal status of hatamoto principles of 
surveying cultivated land. 
 The problem of hatamoto cadastral surveys provides some important clues to 
the status of hatamoto within the Bakuhan system. The Tokugawa Bakufu did not 
conduct surveys of daimyō fiefs while they were occupied by an incumbent. The Bakufu 
did, however, conduct surveys of occupied hatamoto fiefs. In this sense, it appears that 
hatamoto seigneurial rights were subject to more direct Bakufu intervention than 
daimyō. However, it is necessary to distinguish between whether the Bakufu surveyed 
hatamoto fiefs unilaterally and across the board, or in principle only when the hatamoto 
requested extension of a Bakufu survey to their fiefs. 17  This question cannot be 
 
17 Many hatamoto presumably lacked retainers sufficiently experienced to conduct 
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adequately answered at this stage, but it remains an indisputable fact that hatamoto of 
all classes could and did conduct cadastral surveys. This function alone would appear to 
set hatamoto off from daimyō retainers who in principle were restricted to using the 
daimyō cadastral surveys as the basis for administering their fiefs. In view of the wider 
significance of cadastral surveys as part of the function of the state in the Tokugawa 
period, the hatamoto cadastral surveys suggest that hatamoto shared directly in the 
position of the select few who comprised the core of that state.  
 The ability of hatamoto to conduct independent cadastral surveys is the single 
most important argument that can be advanced for hatamoto independence in matters 
of tax/rent. However, this independence was a mixed blessing. When the hatamoto could 
cajole their fief peasants into paying higher rates it worked to the fief-holder’s benefit, 
but it also meant that the hatamoto had to absorb losses resulting from any inability to 
collect tax/rent and other services. According to Kanzaki, the unweighted average of the 
rate of taxation on the 330 hatamoto fiefs falling within the area of modern Kanagawa 
Prefecture was 43% (KKS 3:444-446).18 When seen over time, however, this average 
shows a marked downward trend from a peak of 50 to 60% concentrated in the period 
1620 to 1670. While there are cases of some fiefs maintaining rates of 50 to 60% even 
towards the close of the seventeenth century, most fiefs show a downward trend with 
rates falling to around or below 40%. The longest continual series for collection rates is 
the Tsuchiya fief in Sagami Province. Here rates had fallen from a high of 54% in 1645 
to 38% in 1698. The eruption of Mt Fuji in 1707 spread volcanic ash over Sagami, and 
rates on the Tsuchiya fief fell to around 22-24% for the period 1709-1716. From this low, 
rates recovered to stabilise at around 32% from 1719 until the end of Tokugawa period 
(KKS 3:414). 
 Nonetheless, while significant as one aspect of hatamoto rule, the long-time 
decline in rates of tax/rent collection should not be interpreted as meaning that hatamoto 
abandoned the effort to increase their share of the agricultural surplus. To the contrary, 
the general loss of hatamoto interest in maintaining high rates of direct taxation made 
economic good sense. Initially, the decline in hatamoto taxes seems to have been a 
reaction to over-collection resulting in diminishing returns and wide fluctuations from 
year to year (Tsukishima 1980: 7; KKS 8 Jō [943-946])). Over time, however, the incentive 
 
surveys, and in most cases it was convenient for a fief-holder to ask the Bakufu to 
extend a survey in progress to his fief. For examples, see the case of the Andō above, 
and HMS (76 {72 Commentary}.) 
18 Kanzaki’s figures for rate of collection are based on the assessed tax base, which 
would only change due to land reclamation or a new cadastral survey, rather than 
actual production figures. 
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for hatamoto to try to increase the rates of direct taxation decreased in response to 
economic change. While it is common knowledge that Japan’s rural economy grew over 
time throughout the Tokugawa period, from the eighteenth century on, the main thrust 
in growth changed from rice to commercial crops and cottage industry. Coupled with the 
relative decline in the position of individual hatamoto as bargainers when selling rice in 
a market which had burgeoned beyond what their forefathers had known, this overall 
expansion in the economy meant that it was now economically more efficient for 
hatamoto to depend on means other than tax/rent collected in kind as a means of 
expanding their incomes (Yamaguchi 1962; Tukishima 1980). 
 However, the process of extracting surplus from their fiefs in the form of cash, 
rather than produce in kind, had to be done within the framework of a landholding 
system that bound the hatamoto to the pretence of depending on dues collected in kind. 
The two most common measures hatamoto developed to deal with this situation were the 
systematic use of prepayment of dues in cash (sen’nō), and the extraction of emergency 
impositions (goyō kin). Other forms of increasing exactions such as outright ‘donations’ 
in the form of ‘grace money’ (myōga kin) were also used, but since these were not as 
important as the various loans, they can be ignored here. 
 In theory, both the prepayment of dues and emergency impositions represented 
a monetary advance to the hatamoto against that year’s tax/rent, to be repaid from the 
same with interest. In other words, the hatamoto increased their incomes by incurring 
debts due to their own fief peasants, or when this was not feasible, local merchants. 
Yamamura, as stated earlier, follows early post-war Japanese (Marxist) research in 
interpreting the growth of hatamoto indebtedness to fief peasants as representing a 
proportionate decline in their seigneurial powers. An examination of the way these loans 
functioned within the overall structure of hatamoto finances and the way the loans were 
actually financed, however, suggests otherwise. 
 Charts 1 and 2 show the changes over time of the income (or major part thereof) 
of two hatamoto, and the relative weights within the composition of their incomes of both 
tax/rent and loans. In Chart 1 for the Nagasawa during the period 1975-1805, income 
from tax/rent remained generally inelastic, with loans providing an extra 20 to 50% of 
income in most years. Chart 2, for the Sengoku, shows the same stability and 
composition of income, with loans remaining in proportion to tax/rent until 1819, when 
the balance between the two begins to break down. In both cases, variations in overall 
income were determined almost entirely by the amount of cash loans, and such loans 
were made available regularly over time. 
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 While taking the outward form of free economic activity, loans to hatamoto were 
often non-voluntary. The hatamoto still possessed the means to apply considerable 
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compulsion to their peasant to provide loans, sometimes even when the hatamoto had 
not yet repaid an earlier loan of had effectively defaulted. Even if we ignore cases of gross 
extortion and consider a simple case of being required to prepay one year’s dues in twelve 
monthly instalments, finding the liquid cash to support these payments could present 
considerable problems for fief peasants. While this would present no problem for a larger 
peasant who conducted various commercial enterprises as a side-line, for the greater 
majority of ordinary peasants purchases were made on credit and paid for after the 
harvest. Whatever small cash reserves they may have had, such reserves generally were 
not sufficient to provide a steady flow of cash throughout the year into the hatamoto’s 
coffers. This meant that introducing even a simple plan for prepayment of dues would 
force many peasants to borrow money against the harvest. These debts were incurred 
with their own property and title as collateral, so that either a shortfall in the harvest 
or a delay in hatamoto repayment could spell disaster.19 
 On the other hand, control of the post of fief headman gave wealthier peasants 
important leverage in providing loans to smaller peasants and in controlling the 
disposition of the hatamoto’s tax/rent gained as repayment of loans. The lucrative profits 
to be gained in this way could lead to fierce competition for control of this office, despite 
that dangers that the post could also entail. Not only the peasants, large and small, but 
fief officials could also suffer from hatamoto defaulting on loans. For example, the fief 
intendant of the Yokota (9,500 koku, Musashi Province) had arranged a series of loans 
totalling 680 ryō for the Yokota in 1807 and 1808. These loans were financed by the 
intendant himself borrowing from moneylenders outside the fief. Unfortunately for the 
intendant, the Yokota unilaterally granted themselves a five-year moratorium on 
repayment of the debt, which meant that the fief intendant had to maintain payments 
by selling the title to his own land. The fief headman of the villages under the intendant’s 
supervision made a joint appeal for help on behalf of the intendant to the Yokota, who 
replied by serving the intendant with a sentence of mild house arrest (sashi-hikae) for 
the next four years (HMS 58 {61}). 
 The case of the Yokota points to towards one of the limits on hatamoto ability to 
maintain these extraordinary impositions on the fief: when the fief peasants, large and 
small, lacked the wherewithal to support the hatamoto’s demands, eventually loans had 
to be solicited from moneylenders outside the fief. These people could withhold funds 
with impunity if the hatamoto did not honour his debts.  
 
19 An analysis of the effects of forced loans on the Oguri fief (274.931 koku), Kazusa 
Province, is given in Nishiwaki (1986: 162-182). An actual example of a contract 
made by fief peasants pawning the title of their dry fields to finance repayment of 
tax/rent is given SKS (1000{501}). 
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 Even more important than economic constraints, however, was peasant 
resistance. The peasants used every means at their disposal to limit these extraordinary 
exactions, often resorting to direct appeals to the Bakufu when a hatamoto’s demands 
exceeded acceptable bounds. The sheer fact that it was the peasants who controlled the 
process and the means of production gave them a valuable bargaining position. A 
hatamoto could only gain extraordinary funds through the use of pressure, and when the 
peasants stood to lose as much from bending to such pressure as from resisting it, the 
hatamoto could be forced to compromise. By 1833, the Yokota had had to accept a series 
of strictly scheduled prepayments on their tax/rent and submit a record of all their 
expenditures to their fief headmen before trying to gain any further cash advances. The 
Yokota had been appointed to Bakufu office in 1830, and the added expenditure this 
entailed had led to an accumulated debt of some 1,280 ryō over their budget. When 
approached about financing this debt, the fief headmen refused politely but outright, 
pleading the fief ’s inability to pay. After around 1800, it becomes increasingly common 
to find fief peasants, either collectively or through the fief headmen, negotiating the 
scheduling of prepayments of tax/rent, and dictating the content of their seigneur’s 
household budget, even down to the minutest items such as the pocket money for his 
children, or expenditures on sewing thread and candles (HMS 419-420 {377}, and also 
413-419 {374-376}). It would be wrong to suppose that all hatamoto were reduced to these 
circumstances, or that the tug-o’-war over surplus production followed the same course 
on every fief. One corollary of the basic independence of hatamoto in fiscal matters is 
that there is no single history that is valid for all fiefs. Nonetheless, the trend is 
undeniable: by around 1830, the world of the hatamoto fief was beginning to turn upside 
down. 
 However, the decline of hatamoto ability to obtain non-voluntary loans from 
their fiefs should not be allowed to overshadow the fact that the hatamoto had initially 
chosen these loans as the most effective way of exploiting their political power to 
maximum advantage in the face of economic and social change. Moreover, the spreading 
paralysis of hatamoto fiscal control over fief peasants typically occurred after a struggle, 
often prolonged and always contentious, over control of the growing agricultural surplus. 
Had hatamoto powers indeed been strongly constrained by the Bakufu, such a struggle 
could never have occurred, as the hatamoto would have lacked the wherewithal to 
initiate it.20 Rather, it was the attempt by hatamoto to push their seigneurial powers to 
the very limits and beyond that brought about their own paralysis. 
 
20 A comparison with fief-holding retainers of Sendai domain makes this clear. The 
powers of retainers in Sendai to control their fiefs come close to fitting the image of 
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3. Hatamoto and Fief Law 
The single largest institutional argument for the reduction of hatamoto fiefs to merely 
titular holding is that hatamoto with fiefs totaling less than 3,000 koku are assumed to 
have been deprived of any meaningful rights of jurisprudence. 21  In a dialectical 
materialist approach to history, this means that hatamoto were denied access to the 
lynchpin in the mechanism of extra-economic compulsion fundamental to maintaining 
feudal landownership. Whether one accepts this definition of feudal landownership to be 
meaningful or not, one does not have to be a dogmatic Marxist to agree that, even if 
legitimate rule must also be based on a degree of consent, all rule ultimately depends on 
some degree of compulsion. Furthermore, to the extent that any given rule is personal 
and arbitrary, the degree of compulsion must also become correspondingly greater. 
Hatamoto rule was both ‘public,’ and personal and arbitrary. It was based on both consent, 
grudging or otherwise, and outright compulsion. Moreover, these two facets of hatamoto 
rule were not separate entities, but were two branches sprung from the same root: one 
could not survive without the other. The basis for hatamoto rule was that, contrary to 
received wisdom, the Bakufu confirmed as public law hatamoto access to extensive 
judicial powers, which served as the legal means to enforce the arbitrary aspects of 
hatamoto rule, such as forced ‘donations’ and ‘loans’ from fief peasants. This relationship 
between hatamoto judicial powers and Bakufu authority has two aspects: how the 
Bakufu defined the hatamoto as a source of law, and the role of the hatamoto as an 
enforcer of law. 
 Table 2 provides a preliminary list of known hatamoto laws dealing with fief 
administration. These examples amply illustrate that hatamoto, as hatamoto and 
without regard to any differences in fief size, could and did issue laws for their fiefs 
throughout the Tokugawa period. As with cadastral surveys, there is no evidence in this 
Table for the purported 3,000 koku dividing line among hatamoto having and relevance 
to the ability of hatamoto to formulate and promulgate law. 
  
 
a strictly-regulated system such as was envisaged by Kitajima for hatamoto. In the 
nineteenth century, retainers holding landed-fiefs in Sendai were more concerned 
with ways of circumventing domanial control on the sale of the grain that they had 
collected as tax/rent than with increasing exactions on their peasants, principally 
because the latter path of action was largely closed to them (Morris 1988: 104-106). 
21 Totman, for example, says that ‘in all save the greatest two hundred and fifty-odd 
liege vassal fiefs, judicial issues were handled by the Bakufu… The liege vassal was 
by-passed; he was not court of final resolution’ (1967:137). 
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Table 2 Fiefs Laws Promulgated by Hatamoto  
No. Year Fief Size 
(koku) 
Province Fief-holder Contents 
1 1670 1,000 Sagami/ 
Kazusa 
Tsuchiya 22 articles. Bakufu law; moral exhortation; 
maintenance of roads & bridges; restrictions 
on sale of grain; restrictions on pawning & 
selling land outside of fief; grievance 
procedures; cultivation of land. 
2 1684 340 Sagami Sakamoto 35 articles. Bakufu law; moral exhortation; 
restrictions on off-fief employment; 
grievance procedures. 
3 1697 1,500 Shimōsa Jinbo 3 articles. Directives for a self-administered 
land survey. 
4 1705 500 Sagami Ogasawara 17 articles. Bakufu law (identying 
Ogasawara laws with Bakufu laws); 
maintenance of roads & land; land 
reclamation; restrictions on off-fief 
employment (esp. prostitution); control of 
inheritance of land and chattels; moral 
exhortation: grievance procedures. 
5 1713 650 Sagami Nagata 18 articles. Bakufu law; moral exhortation; 
ban on sale of land & employment off-fief; 
communications with Edo; disposition of 
land left without heir; registration of sale of 
land on-fief. 
6 1736 650 Kazusa Ōi 3 articles. Reiterates lost set of 20 articles 
c.1715; grievance procedures. 
7 1758 750 Shimōsa Ōkawa’uchi 18 articles. Bakufu law; moral exhortation; 
grievance procedures; cultivation of land. 
8 1789 500 Kazusa 
Hitachi 
Sagami 
Takabayashi 26 articles. Bakufu law; moral exhortation; 
restrictions on off-fief employment; 
restrictions on sale of grain; land 
reclamation and new sources of taxation; 
grievance procedures. 
9 1789 650 Sagami Nagata 22 articles. Reiterations of No. 5 + ban on 
secret prostitution & unlicensed sake 
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brewing; grievance procedures; payment of 
tax/rent. 
10 1791 3,000 Musashi Kuze 22 articles. Redevelopment of fief society & 
economy; minute stipulations on social 
conduct, food, attire, & housing; promotion 
of self-sufficiency & staple food crops; 
regulation of hours of work & holidays; child 
raising & education; control of off-fief 
contracts; obedience (NO reference to 
Bakufu law). 
11 1798 1,500 Shimōsa JInbo 12 articles. Bakufu laws; moral exhortation; 
social order and grievance procedures; 
restriction on off-fief employment. 
12 1804 188 Shimōsa Tada In 3 parts (1) identification of Tada laws with 
Bakufu law; (2) instructions for paying 
tax/rent; (3) details of seasonal ‘gifts’ from 
fief to Tada. 
13 1817 1,000 Sagami Akimoto 7 articles. Redevelopment of fief economy; 
land reclamation; grievance procedures; 
sumptuary regulations; moral exhortation & 
rewards; (No reference to Bakufu). 
14 1818 1,000 Sagami Yamana 4 articles + extended commentary; 4 articles 
promulgated by Yamana in person of fief. 
Deal with promotion of frugality; proper 
conduct for fief officials; grievance 
procedures as a way of reviving fief 
economy (No reference to Bakufu). 
15 1828 1,500 Sagami Nakai 49 articles. Bakufu law; limits on off-fief 
employment; dealings with strangers; care 
of sick & weak; law & order; grievance 
procedures; ban on new saké brewers; 
maintenance of irrigation facilities; 
registration of new fields; use of woodlands; 
maintenance of roads; restrictions on 
pawning land outside of fief; control of 
inheritance of land & chattels, + movement 
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into and out of fief; treatment of Nakai 
vassals inspecting fief; use of seals (in 印). 
16 1836 1,500 Sagami 
Kai 
Shimōsa 
Okano 8 articles. Bakufu law; identification with 
Bakufu; moral exhortation; sumptuary, police 
& work regulations to restore village 
economy & society after a series of famines. 
17 1849 3,000 Musashi 
Suruga 
Inaba 51 articles. Bakufu law; moral exhortation; 
ban on infanticide; protection of weak; rules 
for conveying tax/rent rice to Edo; reporting 
procedures in criminal cases; maintenance 
of roads & bridges; post station duty; mutual 
help & responsibility; grievance procedures; 
reporting of land & chattels with no heir. 
18 1866 1,500 Musashi 
Shimōsa 
Suruga 
Okano 36 articles. Moral exhortation; relief 
measures; sumptuary regulations; exchange 
& pawning of land; maintenance of status & 
social order, & roads & bridges. 
Sources (by reference number) 
Ⅰ KKS 8 Jō: 1 (pp.467-468); 4 (136-138); 13 (657-658); 15 (681-686); 
Ⅱ KKS 8 Ge: 10 (94-98); 16 (309-311); 17 (124-128); 18 (311-313) 
Ⅲ Kanzaki 1986: 2 (68-69) 
Ⅳ Kawamura 1969: 7 (15); 8 (8-11); 12 (19-20) 
Ⅴ Kawamura 1970: 3 (44-45); 6 (41-42); 11 (45-46) 
Ⅵ HSS: 5 (460-461); 9 (461-463); 14 (306-310)  
 
 In content, these laws generally conform closely to Bakufu law, with articles 
banning such things as Christianity and other suspect religious practices (principally 
certain Buddhist sects), the sale of land,22  the formation of secret bands (peasant 
uprisings), covert prostitution, traffic in human beings, gambling and disorderly conduct, 
and with other articles encouraging assiduousness in agriculture, filial piety and other 
staples of Bakufu legislation. Searching for self-assertive independence in hatamoto laws 
is not only generally unproductive,23it is fundamentally irrelevant. That hatamoto laws 
 
22 Note the exceptions in numbers 1 and 5 which openly permit the sale of land, and 
the ‘grey’ areas effectively permitting the pawning of land common in the other 
examples. 
23 As does Kanzaki Akitoshi (1986: 76-78). 
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largely follow Bakufu models constitutes the single largest claim to legitimacy that 
hatamoto laws could attain. This symbiosis between hatamoto law and Bakufu law is 
best expressed by the frequency with which hatamoto laws invoke Bakufu law. Those 
laws in Table 2 that make explicit mention of obedience to Bakufu law invariably do so 
in either a preamble or the very first article, commanding the fief peasants to obey 
Bakufu laws,24 and then the laws of the hatamoto and their ancestors. In some cases 
this general stipulation to obey Bakufu laws becomes something more positive, an 
identification of hatamoto law as constituting a continuous entity with Bakufu law.  
 This identification between hatamoto and Bakufu authority is most complete in 
the laws issued by the smallest hatamoto in Table 2, the Tada (no. 12) (Kawamura 
1969:19-20). From the preamble to the main body in two articles, the language of the 
text strains to emphasise the Tada laws as being an extension of Bakufu or kōgi law. The 
crucial passage is in article 2, which states that anyone violating either Bakufu law or 
Tada law and directives, or anyone ‘greedy, corrupt, selfish or insubordinate’ will be 
punished by the Tada, after they have consulted the opinion of the Bakufu. The logic of 
this passage is structured so as to make peasant recalcitrance directed at the Taka an 
offence against Bakufu law, and conversely, to make Tada legal decisions rest under the 
legitimising aegis of Bakufu judgement, the ‘supreme court’ of the time. In this 
relationship, the real judiciary process rested in Tada hands, and the role of the Bakufu 
was to elevate what in reality was a Tada decision to an infinitely superior realm of 
legitimacy.  
 The relationship between Bakufu law and hatamoto law as expressed in 
hatamoto laws was therefore a double-edged sword. Introducing Bakufu law into 
hatamoto laws may have served to restrain the grosser excesses of individual hatamoto, 
but it also supported individual hatamoto authority by relocating it within a much larger 
nexus wherein resistance to an individual seigneur of itself became an attack on the 
whole socio-political fabric. However, what really made the claims of individual hatamoto 
more than empty bluster were the various powers that they possessed to enforce the very 
same law that they defined. The bottom-line for hatamoto ability to enforce law lay in 
the hatamotos’ legal control over the property and person of their fief peasants, and their 
power of jurisdiction based both on these powers and the role given him by the Bakufu 
legal system.  
 
24 In the summary of contents in Table 2, ‘Bakufu law’ signifies the presence of both (a) 
an injunction to obey Bakufu law, and (b) a series of articles directly based on actual 
Bakufu law. 
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 Hatamoto laws often enunciate restrictions on the sale (or pawning) of peasant 
holdings to peasants living outside the fief (Table 2, no. 1, 5). Not only the land itself but 
the produce of that land was subject to restrictions; hence the prohibitions on the sale of 
grain before the annal tax/rent was paid (no. 1,5, 8). A further extension of this logic is 
seen in the various articles requiring peasant inheritance of fief land (and sometimes 
personal goods) to be reported to, and approved by, the hatamoto (no. 4, 5, 15, 17). Seen 
withing this larger framework, the custom of presenting the first fruits of the harvest to 
the fief-holder assumes significance beyond mere quaint custom;25 it becomes one part 
of a subtle web of legal and social bonds affirming the legal primacy of the fief-holders’ 
right to the land and the produce of their fief. It is common knowledge that under normal 
circumstances, Tokugawa peasants were guaranteed the exclusive usufruct of their land. 
Nevertheless, the underlying logic of hatamoto law, as shown so clearly here, assumed 
that the peasants held their land from the hatamoto. They neither ‘owned’ the land, nor 
did they completely own their own goods.  
 Hatamoto laws also often enunciate restrictions on the person of peasants 
attached to the fief. This finds direct expression in articles that restrict the freedom of 
members of fief peasant families to engage in indentured servant work outside the fief 
(no. 4, 5, aa, 15).26 The legal basis for this lies in the role of the hatamoto as the authority 
responsible for drawing up the temple registers within their fiefs. The almost ubiquitous 
prescription of Christianity and other suspect religions or sects in hatamoto laws implies 
more than a mere parroting of Bakufu law: promulgating and enforcing the religious 
control laws entailed the hatamotos’ legal responsibility for those on the temple registers 
they supervised. This legal responsibility meant several things, but for our purposes the 
most significant was that fief peasants were subject to the jurisdiction of the hatamoto’s 
court in any case not involving a non-fief member. Under normal circumstances, this 
control enunciated in hatamoto laws over the property and person of fief peasants was 
largely a formality, but, when combined with the hatamotos’ right (and responsibility) of 
jurisprudence, it could serve to bring severe pressure to bear on fief peasants. 
 Within the structure of Tokugawa law, hatamoto had extensive judicial powers. 
Traditionally, hatamoto judicial rights have been compared to those of daimyō, with the 
 
25 KKS 8 Jō (90-91{158}) provides an unusual example of a hatamoto, the Tada (400 
koku), banning most forms of presents from fief peasants to the Tada and their 
vassals, in 1670. However, even in this unusual edict, the annual sending of the first 
fruits of the harvest is securely maintained.  
26 An example of a hatamoto actually recalling fief residents from indentured service 
outside the fief is given in Yabuta (1980: 132-134). 
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result that hatamoto have been thought of as having only limited powers.27 However, to 
compare hatamoto solely to daimyō and to ignore comparison with other relevant 
standards such as other seigneurs besides hatamoto and daimyo, or the Bakufu’s own 
judicial system, is one-sided and distorting. Originally, hatamoto had the right to both 
try and sentence all cases falling within their jurisdiction, up to and including cases 
involving imprisonment for life (nagarō).28  Only cases involving capital punishment 
were initially beyond the hatamotos’ power to sentence independently, although 
hatamoto did retain the right to try ordinary cases of capital punishment for the greater 
part of the Tokugawa period.29  Towards the close of the Tokugawa period, between 
roughly 1790 and 1830, further restrictions were placed on hatamoto jurisdiction so that 
their right to independently try and pass sentence was limited to cases punishable by 
expulsion from the fief (Hiramatsu 1960: 3-8).30 While these restrictions did mean a 
reduction in the upper limits of hatamoto jurisdiction, they did not necessarily represent 
a qualitative change in the position of the hatamoto as seigneurs.  
 Even in their most reduced state, hatamoto had rights to both try and pass 
sentence that far exceeded those permitted by the Bakufu to rear-vassals (i.e. daimyo 
retainers holding fiefs), who had been restricted to passing sentences of house arrest for 
a maximum of thirty days since the early eighteenth century (Morris 1988: 130-132, 150-
152). Hatamoto judicial rights also far exceeded those of the Bakufu intendants (daikan) 
responsible for local administration of Bakufu lands (tenryō) ; for the greater part of the 
Tokugawa period, these men could pass no sentence more severe than a ‘scolding’ 
(shikari) without seeking higher approval (Ishii 1964: 23-24). More telling is the fact that 
hatamoto judicial powers, considerably exceeded those of the Bakufu’s own judges, and 
 
27 Hiramatsu (1958), later revised as Chapter 2 of Hiramatsu (1960), Ishii (1959; 267-
268) provides a much broader interpretation of hatamoto judicial rights. Of the two, 
Hiramatsu’s work appears to be closer to the evidence. See Hiramatsu (1960: 258-
260 note 1) for Hiramatsu’s rejoinder to Ishii. 
28 Imprisonment for life (nagarō) is the equivalent of deportation (ontō) under Bakufu 
law, as few if any hatamoto had an island suitable for use for deportation. 
Imprisonment for life/deportation was the next degree in punishment below the 
various forms of capital punishment.  
29 Ishio Yoshihisa points out that under Tokugawa law, trying a case in reality 
presupposed passing a provisional sentence, since the lower court defined what 
crime the accused was being tried for, thereby largely predetermining the sentence. 
Allowing hatamoto to investigate and try cases (tegiri ginmi) meant that the Bakufu 
merely confirmed the appropriateness of the provisional sentence determined by the 
hatamoto (Ishio 1975: 268-271). 
30 Expulsion from the fief is the equivalent of first or second degree exile (tsuihō) undre 
Bakufu law, and represents the next degree in punishment below deportation (onto) 
(Ishii 1964: 80-81). 
Hatamoto Rule 
J.F.Morris 
 
28 
 
even when curtailed towards the close of the Tokugawa period, became the effective 
equivalent of those judges’ own independent powers.31 Throughout the entire Tokugawa 
period, hatamoto were never defined as having powers inferior to those possessed by any 
organ or officeholder within the Bakufu’s own judicial system, other than the Shōgun 
himself. In other words, while it is certain that hatamoto were not quite the equal of 
daimyo in terms of judicial powers, they were still closer to the daimyo than they were 
to any comparable source of judicial power within the Bakuhan system. In fact, the 
Bakufu itself considered hatamoto legal powers to be the equivalent of those of daimyo 
within its self-definition of its overall legal system. The principle of hatamoto 
equivalency to daimyo is unambiguously laid out, for example, in a reply made by a 
Superintendent of Finances (kanjō bugyō) to a query concerning the extent of hatamoto 
judicial powers (quoted in Hiramatsu 1958:2).32 
 The ‘equivalence’ of hatamoto to daimyo in judicial powers is crucial to 
understanding the legal position of hatamoto within the Bakuhan system, but its 
importance in defining real hatamoto powers requires careful qualification. Many 
hatamoto lacked the resources necessary to either execute or imprison their fief peasants 
for life. Nor indeed did they really need to concern themselves with such serious crimes 
 
31 The closest Bakufu equivalents to civil judges were the Superintendents (the various 
bugyō). These officials could not pass sentences of first-degree exile (jū-tsuihō) or 
above without seeking the approval of the councilors (rōjū). The sentence of first-
degree exile was one degree lighter than the sentence of jail-for-life which the 
hatamoto could pass in their own courts. Furthermore, even the councillors had to 
seek the approval of the Shōgun himself for sentences of deportation (the Bakufu 
equivalent of hatamoto jail-for-life) and all cases of capital punishment (Ishii 
1964:23-24). 
32 It should be noted that no edict exists clearly defining the extent of hatamoto 
judicial rights. This is not surprising, however, given that the only Bakufu 
statement defining seigneurial jurisdiction was that issued in 1697, enunciating the 
principle of daimyo judicial independence in criminal cases (Hiramatsu 1958:2). 
However, that this 1697 edict was part of a larger Bakufu programme to define the 
judicial powers of appropriated to the different levels of the seigneurial hierarchy is 
witnessed by the fact that four years after the 1697 edict was issued, the Bakufu 
brought pressure to bear on Sendai domain to strictly limit the judicial powers of its 
larger retainers (i.e. Tokugawa rear-vassals) vis-à-vis their fief peasants. In the 
same year, the Tokugawa collateral domain of Nagoya passed an edict almost 
identical to that issued in Sendai, limiting the judicial powers of its retainers in 
their fiefs (Morris 1988:130-132, 150-152). Hatamoto were exempt from such 
pressure, retaining the extensive judicial powers until the social unrest of the early 
nineteenth century led to these being replaced by Bakufu prerogatives. While 
implicit, rather than explicit, the opinion of the Bakufu official quoted by Hiramatsu 
is corroborated by the fact that hatamoto were not treated the same as daimyo 
retainers at this crucial juncture in the definition of seigneurial powers under the 
Bakuhan system.  
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as required these sentences, much less capital punishment. As petty seigneurs, their 
primary concern was the much more prosaic business of extracting as much agricultural 
surplus from their fief as possible. There was no internal logic compelling hatamoto to 
be directly concerned with the maintenance of the larger social order, so long as this 
worked to their benefit under the protection of the Bakufu system. For hatamoto, the 
significance of their ‘equivalence’ to daimyo was that it meant that the Bakufu defined 
hatamoto judicial rights as being essentially the equal of Bakufu courts, except in cases 
of demonstrated hatamoto incompetence, or in cases that involved capital punishment. 
It is within this framework that the right of the hatamoto to independently try and 
sentence certain cases gains it true significance. 
 Tokugawa justice was inquisitory: once arrested, one was considered guilty 
unless proven innocent. Basic interrogative procedure was directed towards securing a 
confession as the most important element in supporting what the fact of arrest already 
proved. Furthermore, the use of extended confinement and considerable physical 
coercion was considered a natural part of the interrogation process. 33  Without even 
passing a sentence, a hatamoto could imprison and seriously incommode a peasant 
simply by accusing him of wrong-doing. While the hatamoto could also bring this kind of 
pressure to bear directly on smaller peasants, it was the emerging wealthier peasants 
accumulating the growing agricultural surplus who were the prime targets for hatamoto 
coercion.34 This stratum usually supplied the incumbents for the post of fief intendant, 
fief headman, and heads of the five-man group. The complexity of the record-keeping 
that these posts entailed, the frequent temptation to misuse the position to one’s own 
advantage, and the existence of many ‘grey’ areas in accounting procedures meant that 
there was sufficient opportunity for hatamoto to trump up charges of malfeasance 
against a fief official who was uncooperative in producing funds on request. In such a 
case the substance and the nature of the charges were almost irrelevant: once initiated, 
an investigation became its own justification, and took on a life of it own. 
 An incident from the Morikawa (700 koku) fief in Sagami Province provides a 
case in point (KKS 8 Ge [22-26{714}]). In 1838 the Morikawa began an investigation 
 
33 For their age, however, Tokugawa prisons exhibited some unusually enlightened 
aspects. For example, they separated the sexes, and later separated hard-core 
criminals from lesser offenders, and went so far as to establish reformatory work-
centres (Ishii 1964: Chaps 2 & 3). 
34 The exception, of course, was in disputes over where to peg the level of traditional 
tax/rent, especially in times of bad harvests. A record of an investigation conducted 
by a hatamoto (Kurahashi, 1,000 koku) in 1832 of an organised peasant protest over 
the level of tax/rent and the punishments accorded the ringleaders is given in KKS 8 
Ge (28-34{716}). 
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based on trumped-up charges against the present incumbent, who incidentally was 
having difficulty sustaining a series of loans he had arranged to be paid to the Morikawa. 
The present headman was put under arrest in the Morikawa residence in Edo, where he 
was subjected to beatings and physical coercion to induce a confession. The headman 
‘disappeared’ from prison, and his house, lands and belongings were confiscated for this 
new ‘crime.’ His brother and another relative appealed this confiscation to the Bakufu 
Superintendent of Finances. The Superintendent of Finances, in accordance with the 
principles of Bakufu jurisdiction, handed the two over to the Morikawa, where they were 
subjected to beatings so severe that they were put in fear of their lives. The last we know 
of the incident is that the headman’s wife attempted a last desperate appeal to the 
Bakufu Inspector General (Ōmetsuke). This incident demonstrates an extreme example 
of hatamoto use of judicial powers to extract money from fief peasants, but there is 
nothing in it to suggest that this incident was necessarily exceptional. The subplot of 
cut-throat peasant competition for administrative office that forms a crucial part of the 
background to the incident was endemic to society at the time.35 The investigative and 
punitive powers of the Morikawa within their court and the attitude of the Bakufu 
officials involved conform to the general principles of Tokugawa law as seen above.36 It 
is in this kind of minor incident that the vague and ill-defined rights of hatamoto as 
suggested in their laws could be brought together in their court of law with devastating 
effects for the victim. That the esoteric forms of capital punishment and long-term 
imprisonment were beyond their reach did not matter at all: it was the legal 
arbitrariness built by the Bakufu into the very basis of Tokugawa law that provided the 
teeth for hatamoto fief rule. 
 
Conclusion 
The hatamoto constituted a large and strategically important class of seigneurial 
landholders in the sensitive area centred around the Shōgunal capital of Edo, and for 
this, if for no other reason, deserve serious attention. Earlier writing has seen the 
hatamoto to have had only very limited rights as seigneurs, and to have been under the 
tight control of the Tokugawa Bakufu. This view, however, was based on only a few 
inadequate case studies of actual hatamoto fiefs, on one the hand, and on a one-way 
comparison of hatamoto with daimyo land-holding to the exclusion of other relevant 
 
35 For examples of strikingly similar incidents, see Ishio (1975: Chap. 6) and Nishiwaki 
(1986: 169-172). 
36 For a further example of hatamoto investigative powers, see KKS 8 Jō (109-121 
{178-188}). For another example of Bakufu handling of peasant protests, see 
Takahashi (1986: 262-267). 
Hatamoto Rule 
J.F.Morris 
 
31 
 
standards on the other. Compared to daimyō, hatamoto seigneurial rights were 
undeniably more limited. However, closer examination of hatamoto rights in the most 
fundamental areas of taxation and jurisprudence shows that hatamoto rights were much 
closer to those possessed by daimyō than any other relevant standard, such as daimyō 
retainers whom hatamoto are supposed to most closely resemble. Moreover, in both areas, 
hatamoto rights were the functional equivalent of daimyō rights so far as matters of 
actually implementing fief rule were concerned. Therefore, it is fundamentally incorrect 
to argue that hatamoto seigneurial rights atrophied during the Tokugawa period. On the 
contrary, the Bakuhan system, far from working to eliminate hatamoto seigneurial 
rights, systematically worked to support and reinforce them. The Bakufu did restrain 
individual excesses which, if left unchecked, could have threatened the legitimacy of the 
system as a whole, but it never attacked the principle of hatamoto landholding as such. 
Rather, the Bakufu saw the hatamoto as constituting an integral part of the landholding 
class, with their land-rights being more than an empty title. Consequently, one cannot 
realistically consider the Bakuhan polity to have been a league of just some 270 large-
holding seigneurs, i.e. the Shōgun and the daimyō. Expanding the number of people one 
admits to the ranks of Tokugawa seigneurs demands more than a simple quantitative 
readjustment: it forces a reassessment of the concept that Tokugawa Japan represented 
a highly centralized and bureaucratic state. Instead, it should be considered to have been 
a system organized on basically seigneurial principles. 
 What then, is a seigneurial system, and how does this term relate to the terms 
‘feudalism’ and ‘early modern’ alternatively employed in discussing Tokugawa history?  
 The earlier debate over whether Tokugawa Japan was feudal or not appears to 
have died down without having reached a satisfactory solution. Hall (1970: 46) avoids a 
clear argument for Tokugawa Japan having been feudal or otherwise, and states instead 
that its ‘feudal content’ was ‘declining’ and it can only be called feudal with certain 
provisos. Part of Hall’s inability to decisively resolve his own question stems from the 
very vagueness of the term ‘feudalism,’ whose validity as a historical term has been 
seriously questioned (Brown 1974). On the other hand, the label ‘early modern’ now 
gaining currency is no more precise a term than ‘feudalism,’ and substituting one 
imprecise term for another obfuscates as much as it illuminates. Part of the problem 
with both of the preceding terms is that they attempt to provide holistic labels for 
vaguely-defined periods before scholars can agree on mutually acceptable outlines of the 
details of each period. In order to avoid sterile debates over the meaning of vague terms, 
this paper suggests the more limited term ‘seigneurial system’ to describe the 
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relationship between the rural peasantry and ruling landholding class as the most basic 
relationship of state rule and social control in Tokugawa Japan. 
 Seigneurial systems are not unique to Japan. They exist under feudalism, but 
they can also exist independently of feudalism defined as a system of fief-holding 
connected by personal bonds of allegiance and military service. Seigneurial systems can 
exist wherever the dominant form of production is one where a landholding class 
entrusts cultivation to farmers who work the land they hold from the landholder as an 
independent unit of cultivation. In short, the classical Marxist definition of feudalism as 
a system of production wherein a lord (seigneur) rents his land to a personally unfree 
but economically independent small-scale cultivator describes a seigneurial system 
rather than feudalism as defined above. Under a seigneurial system, the greater part of 
the populace lives subject to the landholding class, the seigneurs, who divert a large 
share of the agricultural surplus to their own consumption, and thus remove this surplus 
from investment in more economically productive areas. While a powerful economic 
sector centred on the seigneurial consumer market may develop (as happened in 
sixteenth and seventeenth century Japan), the ruling class remains the seigneurial class, 
and society in general still lives under the control of the seigneurs. Because it is a system 
oriented towards maintaining the interests of the seigneurial class as landholders and 
consumers, it is a system inimical to modern economic growth. Under such a system, the 
latter must strike its roots in areas removed from the centres of the seigneurial economy, 
exemplified by Tokugawa Japan’s castle towns. The explanatory value of the term 
seigneurial system lies in directing attention to the structural inter-relations between 
politics and economy. While obviously closely related to the traditional Marxist definition 
of feudalism, restricting the term to what the Marxist definition really defines and 
cutting out what it does not properly explain, i.e. fief feudalism, should make the term a 
more effective analytical tool, not only in discovering Tokugawa Japan, but also in 
drawing attention to some of the deeper similarities between Tokugawa Japan and other 
contemporary societies.  
 How, then, would acknowledging the significance of hatamoto landholding, and 
thereby redefining the Bakuhan polity as a seigneurial system, change our 
understanding of Tokugawa history? 
 First, if one accepts that the hatamoto ruled sui generis and not in accordance 
with fief size expressed in terms of kokudaka, certain ideas about fief rule and the 
ordering of hierarchy within the Bakuhan system must be revised. Received wisdom 
argues that hatamoto rule should have diminished in proportion to fief size, but the 
examples provided in this paper actually suggest the opposite: the more extreme 
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examples of hatamoto pushing their rule beyond the limits occur on the smaller fiefs 
rather than the larger ones. One scholar, Ishio Yoshihisa (1975: Chap. 6) has suggested 
that this is not accidental but is something endemic to the very nature of the Bakuhan 
system: that its, that as a paternalistic system as defined by Weber, one would expect to 
find greater arbitrariness and more excesses in the exercise of power at the lower levels 
of authority, such as in hatamoto fiefs. If the traditional equation between fief size and 
fief rule is thus to be turned on its head, then what can be posited as the organising 
principle behind hatamoto fief rule?  
 The primary institutional basis for hatamoto control of his fief was the Bakufu 
definition of hatamoto judicial powers as being the equivalent of those a daimyō. At the 
same time, the Bakufu denied similar wide-ranging powers to retainers of daimyō, even 
though some of these samurai actually held larger and better controlled fiefs than many 
hatamoto (Morris 1988: Chaps 5 & 7). The common principle lying behind this Bakufu 
definition of samurai judicial powers was that only samurai seigneurs in a direct vassal 
relationship with the Shōgun could be entrusted with full judicial powers (or the 
equivalent) and, conversely, rear-vassals should be restricted to a greatly reduced set of 
judicial rights. Fief size and the actual ability of any given type of seigneur to control his 
fief were decidedly of secondary importance.37  
 Second, the Tokugawa principle of organising the hierarchy of seigneurial rights 
in terms of the degree of each seigneur’s relationship to the Shōgun meant more than 
just a legal equivalence. The hatamoto were more than just the bureaucratic 
functionaries of the Tokugawa: they were on an essentially equal footing with the daimyō 
as one of the select group of seigneurs constituting the core of the Bakuhan seigneurial 
state. The hatamoto fief was not an extraneous organ that could harmlessly atrophy 
away. The Bakufu bureaucracy which could have served the purposes of a truly 
centralising Bakufu really began to mature only in the late seventeenth century after a 
full century or so of development of the Bakuhan system. This meant that it had to grow 
around and between the hatamoto and other direct vassals of the Tokugawa Shōgun 
without making any real inroads into their entrenched position. To dislodge these 
seigneurs from the heart of the Bakuhan system would have required a major political 
upheaval, not the gradual series of compromises that were the reality of Tokugawa 
politics. A crisis for the hatamoto, therefore, represented a crisis for the Bakuhan polity 
 
37 Hiramatsu Yoshirō suggests that the gokenin, men of even lower rank and usually 
holding smaller fiefs than the hatamoto , possessed judicial rights the equivalent of 
a small hatamoto, further reinforcing the argument that the crucial principle in 
defining samurai seigneurial rights under the Bakuhan system was whether a 
samurai fief-holder was a direct vassal of the Tokugawa Shōgun or not (1960: 299). 
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itself, and the spreading paralysis in hatamoto fief rule that became evident in the 
closing years of the Tokugawa period was a sign of a larger crisis for the Bakuhan system 
as it was constituted. 
 Third, in considering economic growth in the Tokugawa period, the English-
language literature seems to gloss over the economic aspects of the seigneurial system. 
It was the dominant samurai control of the agricultural surplus established under 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598), that led to the spurt of urban development in the 
formative stages of the Bakuhan system. For example, the economic dominance of the 
city of Ōsaka would have been unthinkable without the driving engine of samurai control 
of the agricultural surplus, coupled with samurai consumption. However, it is also 
equally true that as the overall Tokugawa economy grew, the relative importance of the 
seigneurial economy decreased, and moreover, as one of the weaker links within the 
chain of the seigneurially-dominated economy, the hatamoto suffered particularly from 
the seigneurial backslide. The decline in hatamoto rates of direct collection of tax/rent 
and the move towards use of their political power to gain non-voluntary loans was 
principally a result of the hatamoto facing rapidly diminishing returns from the 
collection and marketing of tax/rent in kind in an economy where they were increasingly 
unable to do this on suitably favourable terms. The decline in hatamoto rates of collection, 
therefore, should be seen properly as an economic phenomenon and not confused with 
their political powers, which they retained essentially undiminished until the demise of 
the Bakuhan system itself. 
 The essentially economic question of to what extent the hatamoto may have 
succeeded or otherwise in maintaining their relative economic position in qualitative 
terms after the seventeenth century remains beyond the scope of this paper. What is 
relevant to our theme is that, from the eighteenth century, the hatamoto chose to play a 
delicate balancing game, using their political powers of coercion to counterbalance the 
increasing economic power of the peasants. This ploy was successful to at least some 
extent, until economic pressure on the hatamoto in the nineteenth century forced them 
into a fierce struggle with peasants over control of the growing agricultural surplus.  
The political disruptions stemming from this struggle may be the most important 
problem concerning the socio-economic relationships centred on hatamoto fiefs. The 
interconnection between hatamoto attempts to increase exactions and the interests of 
peasant families seeking to advance their position at their fellows’ expense meant that 
the issue of resistance by fief peasants to extra exactions became intertwined with the 
issue of economic competition amongst the villagers. This phenomenon was not unique 
to hatamoto fiefs: most efforts by daimyō to increase revenue through domain-supervised 
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monopolies worked on similar principles. However, since the economic alternatives open 
to hatamoto were more limited, their dependence on using wealthy village merchants 
was that much larger and the effects often that much more direct. The marriage of 
hatamoto rule with the interests of fief headmen meant that both conflicts between 
wealthy and poorer peasants, and commercial rivalries amongst wealthy peasants 
became inevitably inter-twined with the already strained relationship between peasants 
and hatamoto over the division of the agricultural surplus. Therefore, hatamoto rule was 
especially prone to provoking strong peasant resistance, not just because additional 
hatamoto exactions were an unwanted burden, but because the process involved served 
too often also as a catalyst to bring other antagonisms within village society to boiling 
point. This, coupled with the tendency for hatamoto to alienate the support of the very 
same village elite on whom control of their fiefs depended, eventually led to a bankruptcy 
of the legitimacy of hatamoto rule and the system that supported it. 
 However, while acknowledging that hatamoto generally lost out in the economic 
struggle, the degree to which the balance of power shifted in favour of rich peasant can 
be overstated. In case after case one finds wealthy peasants engaged in life-and-death 
struggles for control of the post of fief headman, such as was the case in the incident 
involving the Morikawa fief headman in 1838. This rivalry amongst members of the 
village elite meant that although the hatamoto were dependent on them as a group, at 
the same time they were often able to play off rivalries within the group to maintain 
some control over its individual members. This expendability of individual fief headmen 
meant that while the post could bring considerable monetary profits, it also could entail 
great risk. Nonetheless, as there was no shortage of bidders for the post throughout most 
of the Tokugawa period, this suggests that other avenues for commercial development 
within many villages were still sufficiently scarce that the risks involved in working for 
the hatamoto were outweighed by the lack of other opportunities. This may also reflect 
the degree to which hatamoto directives could affect life and commerce within a fief, and 
that many families considered it the lesser of two evils to be directly associated with the 
hatamoto rather than to be merely passively exposed to his whims. In short, the economic 
ascendency of the wealthy peasants did not translate, and could not translate under the 
status system of the period, into direct political power. Thus the political power of the 
hatamoto was pitched against the economic power of the peasants, but neither could gain 
a permanent victory against the other, since neither could subsume the others’ power 
base. So long as the Bakuhan system itself was in place, the hatamoto, despite their 
bankruptcy, still retained the political means to attempt another attack on peasant 
accumulation of wealth when circumstances permitted. Therefore, the struggle between 
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hatamoto and fief peasants progressed not towards a resolution, but towards a 
debilitating deadlock. It was this breakdown of the old covenant of protection and 
support granted by the hatamoto to fief peasants, more than intrusions on seigneurial 
privilege aimed towards modern state-building by the Bakufu, that prepared peasants 
on the Kantō Plain to accept a new form of government after 1868. 
 Fifth, if a covenant existed between ruled and ruler on hatamoto fiefs, we need 
to explore in what ways this was expressed and maintained. The idea that samurai rule 
in general under the Bakuhan system rested on a covenant has been well studied 
(Scheiner 1978), but how this covenant was expressed under different parts of the system 
remains unexplored. For the peasants on hatamoto fiefs, apart from the general ways in 
which this covenant was expressed (principally as appeals to the hatamoto’s 
responsibility to guarantee peasants ability to maintain their usufruct of fief land), this 
covenant took on aspects less of loyalty to an idea, as it tended to become on Bakufu land 
(tenryō), and more of a personal loyalty to the hatamoto’s house or lineage. The hatamoto, 
for their part, gave expression to this personal bond in gifts to their fief peasants on 
important ceremonial occasions, principally the New Year. These gifts were generally in 
nature of food or drink, or both. For the fief headman, in particular, it seems to have been 
common to present his greetings in a personal audience where he received a cup of saké 
directly from the hatamoto as part of the New Year’s ritual at the hatamoto’s Edo 
residence.38 This specific ritual paralleled that between a samurai lord and his vassals 
at the New Year, and was a visible ritual statement of the bond between the hatamoto 
and the fief headman. The ritual significance of the granting of food and drink to the 
general body of fief peasants was that it gave the recipients the status of members of the 
hatamoto’s ie (‘house’), thereby expressing the relationship between ruler and ruled as 
that of patron and client, protector and dependent. In considering rule on hatamoto fiefs, 
the intangible bonds between hatamoto and peasants, particularly those with the fief 
headman, need to be taken seriously as one element which shaped the relations between 
the two. On the majority of fiefs for the greater part of the Tokugawa period, the 
dominant language of interaction between hatamoto and peasants was that of duty, 
obligation, and mutual responsibility, and not that of open conflict. If the bureaucratic 
structure of the larger daimyō domains and the Bakufu in the Tokugawa period presage 
the modern state, the relation between the hatamoto and their peasants prefigures the 
paternalistic patron-client relationships that also have survived as an important part of 
modern Japanese social relationships. 
 
38 For a good example of this ritual, see SKS (949-956{459} esp. p. 951). 
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 Finally, in considering how politics and political structures actually functioned 
under the Bakuhan system, one cannot continue to set up an externally derived and false 
opposition between Bakufu and hatamoto rule. This totally distorts the fundamentally 
symbiotic relationship between the two, whereby Bakufu authority provided the 
necessary basis for hatamoto rule, and where hatamoto supplemented the inadequacies 
of the Bakufu bureaucratic structure. 
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Glossary of Japanese Terms 
 
Bakuhan sei 幕藩制 
bugyō  奉行 
daikan  代官 
daimyō  大名 
gokenin  御家人 
goyōkin  御用金 
hatamoto 旗本 
hyakushō 百姓 
ie  家 
jū-tsuihō 重追放 
kanjō bugyō 勘定奉行 
kōgi  公儀 
kokudaka 石高 
komononari 小物成 
myōgakin 冥加金 
nagarō  永牢 
nengu  年貢 
ōmetsuke 大目付 
ontō  遠島 
rōjū  老中 
ryō  両 
saké  酒 
sashihikae 差控 
sennō  銭納 
shikari  叱 
shoshi hatto 諸士法度 
tegiri ginmi 手切吟味 
tenryō  天領 
toyui  戸結 
tsuihō  追放 
 
